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We need to
begin to distinguish between technological, economic, and ‘eonic’ evolution. We
can see by direct correlation that technological evolution proceeds in many
cases outside the eonic sequence, and economies are universal or omnipresent
factors of culture. The rise of the modern world is confusing because it is the
climax of a long development, and mixes technological and economic breakthroughs
in a more abstract cultural evolution that sets the framework. That is our eonic
effect, and it transcends economic and technological histories. In the modern
case, the three separate components suddenly come together in a tremendous
climax, but they should be seen as separate processes. The point is that
macro-history in our sense doesn’t control these other sequences. It influences
them where they overlap, but, by and large, they are human sources. A man can
create something, innovate with a new technology, but that can happen at any
time. Technological discovery can happen anywhere, anytime. And economic
behavior stretches over vast areas, and occurs at all times. But the eonic
sequence is carefully concentrated in its effects. In fact it seems to act by a
minimum principle. Suppose you had a limited amount of energy to interact with
civilizations, and you wish to act on the whole set of them. How would you do
that? The eonic effect shows, amazingly, one way to do that. Pick a set of
hotspots, act briefly, hope for good diffusion, and make sure the next time you
interact that it is not in the same place, but not to far away to have to start
over.
The Greek Axial by
comparison Separating these different components can be done by considering
the comparison of the modern transition and the Greek Axial. The structure of
the two transitions is roughly the same, yet in the first case we do not see the
emergence of capitalism, the printing press, or the technological explosion of
modern science.
The eonic sequence is different from the random activity of
economies, it stands in relation to a larger pattern. Economies are large fields
of economic free agents. Economic activity spreads over a large area, occurs
continuously, has its own history. Its dynamic is different. All these things
can overlap, interact, but essentially they are different processes. Note that
‘something like capitalism’ is almost present from the beginning of world
history, since Paleolithic man starting trading in obsidian. But the
intersection, overlap, of ‘econostream’ and ‘eonic sequence’ can sometimes
produce a dramatic effect. The Industrial Revolution is a good example. The
eonic sequence generates a new form of capitalism. But, from then on the result
proceeds as econostream. This approach resolves, by the way, the severe
confusions that caused Marxists to tie their heads in knots with incorrect
theories. There is something broader than the evolution of economic systems.
In general, in our distinction of ‘eonic determination’ and
‘free action’, technical innovation is a function of the discoverer’s abilities,
hence falls into our category, ‘free action’. It doesn’t really need that
‘extra’ from the eonic effect. In a similar way, economies spread out over large
areas, indeed globally. These, therefore, also fall into the category ‘free
action’. It may of course happen that econostream, technostream, and eonic
sequence overlap briefly with spectacular results. A good example is the
Industrial Revolution, and one reason we tend to take it as the generator of
modernity, but that won’t work.
The truly foundational advances, especially the most
elusive cultural ones, tend to be clustered, and, no doubt because they are
energy intensive, intermittent. These, and consider for example the case of
ancient Greece,
tend to be non-randomly distributed, hence are something more than ‘free
action’. We assign them to our (undefined, save by periodization and
geographical focus) ‘eonic determination’. We cannot avoid this distinction if
we see that the innate abilities of members of particular cultural streams are
probably evenly distributed in every generation, while periods of great advance
are non-random, indeed in a sequential pattern. We see at once why people are
puzzled by the Gutenberg Revolution, and the Chinese inventions of gunpowder,
printing, the compass. The field of technical innovation can occur at random,
hence to the most technically savvy. The flow of these innovations into the
eonic sequence supercharges that sequence, but doesn’t cause it. We will note
later the strong resemblance of the Greek transition, so-called, to the rise of
the modern. Note that the first had none of this technology, while the second
surged even further with them.
There is more to history than economics then. Historical
materialism, left or right, was a great
idea, but it is misleading us. The reason is that while economic activity can
obviously influence society, the superstructure, its action is dependent on the
social evolution of institutions to make it work at all. The modern world is
often said to be a ‘capitalist age’, but that is not really the case, in the
sense of a fixed stage of history, in the Marxist sequence. The rise of the
modern, the transition, after all, was mercantilist. What we call capitalism
suddenly crystallized near our ‘divide’. The general change of culture was very
open ended. So far from being the teleological outcome of economic stages of
history, the new capitalism is an ad hoc
outcome whose effects required and received immediate challenge from the
left.
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