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As we look at our three turning points, we begin to realize, or suspect,
that we are observing a cycl
ical phenomenon whose structure sticks out like
a dinosaur bone from the backdrop of history. Although our core eonic pattern is
secure as an empirical map, it makes sense only if we assume a kind of frequency
phenomenon, and it is useful to consider an extended and falsifiable frequency
hypothesis over and above our basic core. It is hard to see how something on
this scale could be cyclical, but then again, it is clear from the facts that
something like this is the case. We can attempt a reverse-engineered deduction
for this situation, whatever its merits. But a three beat sequence (we are
highly suspicious, as we will see, that this is a five beat sequence) simply
isn’t enough to draw final conclusions, but such an hypothesis is a useful
wrapper for the core eonic effect.
Ideas of cyclical theories
have, historically, created hopeless confusion, the most notorious example being
the lore of cycles of the Great Year, but our data and analysis shows the
beautiful and elegant solution to the riddle. Spengler and Toynbee with their
ideas of ‘cycles of civilization’ have further muddled the question. Our eonic
data shows us that the right approach is to see that the cyclical phenomenon
proceeds independently of the civilizations it touches. Instead of Toynbean
civilizations we will think in terms of ‘streams’ of culture, as these intersect
and the ‘eonic sequence’.
Myths of the Great Year One value of
our frequency hypothesis is to be done with the lore of speculations over the
Great Year
, based on a cyclical notion 2150 years in
length. This phantom has haunted civilization long enough. We can see that
intuitions of cylical mythologists were onto something they could not have
understood. Our frequency hypothesis, based on 2400 year intervals, explodes the
hallucinations of the Great Year that have resurfaced in modern times in the
various notions of the New Age.
Our ‘eonic’ cycles are
more like simple tempo, a clocklike rhythm, and show us three periods of rapid
advance, followed by medieval periods in the first two cases. Why do they stand
out? They are not inherently different, their immense creativity apart, from any
other periods, myths of revelation notwithstanding. Why does advance slow,
create what we will call sequential dependency, even go in reverse, from Athens to Rome? They show a kind of sudden
acceleration. It is a strange situation. A fragment of rich structure in a void,
its suspected antecedents disappearing into preliterate fog.
As we pull away from the
early modern, and archaeology discovers the sources of earliest civilization, we
discover a pattern, and linear assumptions collapse. We feel a kind of ‘Hey wait
a minute’ about random advance. As the dataset pulls across 5000 years, a
different picture emerges. We have essentially all we need for a practical use
of the eonic data, but it suggests something more that we can formulate as a
frequency hypothesis, and a commentary on cyclical theories. An hypothesis is
just that, and is open to falsification.
A frontier effect Cyclical theories
have produced great confusion. One reason is that a period over two millennia
was never observable in antiquity. Another reason is that our system is global
and moves between civilizations, which are secondary constructs. Each tick of
the frequency beat shows the eonic process in another region: the frontier of
the oikoumene created by an earlier stage. The Axial Greek and Judaic instances
are classic examples. Finally, in addition there is often a hopscotch
synchronous effect at each stage, further confusing the simple sequence. The
frequency is really a kind of tempo.
But the question then is,
cycles of what? What is this frequency, barely above a whisper? How can whole
cultures remorph themselves via relative transforms on a rough schedule? We
don’t know, but it makes sense, as we have seen in our reverse-engineered
approach, to think that a system ‘evolving freedom’ in any sense would go into
alternation. Alternation reconciles the information paradox of a deterministic
system, and as the data shows, the net information or novelty of the system,
rapidly increases at selected intervals. This system is so complex we will
probably never know, and we can default to the idea of tempo. Observing tempo is
the one thing we can analyze in a hyper-complex system. For what it is worth,
the data corresponds perfectly to the idea of self-organization, transparently,
but we cannot connect this with current theories along these lines. This isn’t
thermodynamics.
The basic series that we
suspect, then, is a simple extension in 2400 year intervals backward to the
onset of the Neolithic. This assumes a kind of monotone sequence. Since we have
a two beat sequence that is nearly a three beat sequence, it must be admitted
that all sorts of other frequency possibilities exist.
Another frequent division
of human cultural evolution attempts
to grapple with the immensity of man’s past, and the acceleration
of his
more recent entry into civilization with a series of stages that map the
entirety in a series of periods of unequal length. Thus, one frequent
categorization is the division into ‘stages’
of
cultural evolution, based on the idea of ‘transformation’, giving us
1. A Paleolithic
transformation,
2. The Agricultural
Revolution,
3. The Urban Revolution
,
4. The Industrial
Revolution
.
These schemes are useful
enough, but throw thinking off-track, and confuse ‘pure stages’ of unequal
length with their labels, and quite understandably attempt to ‘glove’ a long
rising curve punctuated by interrupts in its last three stages. The exponential
and cycl
ical are blended, as is the technological, economic and cultural. They
are mixing economics, technology, and cultural evolution in a spurious unity
that wishes a bridge to the Paleolithic. Let us simply void the general rubric
search and use our monotone sequence fragment empirically, as far as it goes.
Then a great insight arises. Everything falls into place. But we must sacrifice
absolute beginnings, and are left with an hypothesis of a monotone sequence.
???
1. the ‘birth of
civilization’,
2. the (relative) rise of
the classical civilizations,
3. and the onset of the
modern world,
???
This, at first, less
desirable scheme is far more revealing, but comes with the price tag of
renouncing beginning and ending. It is difficult to restrain the temptation to
complete this sequence, backwards or (armed with basic Zarathustra) forwards,
although we can suggest a Neolithic, and New World extension. But the relation
of the New World civilizations to TP1, 2, if any, needs to be sequestered due to
the lack of evidence, although its place in relation to overall civilization is
unlikely in the extreme to be an exception to the pattern, with apologies to the
general case made for independent cultural evolution
in the New World. This is quite heretical. It is tantamount to
saying ‘our current system’ can’t be derived from antecedent histories. It is
really evolving!
Thus theorists fail to
consider a periodic rhythm of unnamed stages visible in historic times,
reluctant to sacrifice absolute origins. Marx was hot on the trail of a
discrete-continuous model, but he still wished to find named stages. Generally
the influence of ‘historical economic materialism’ is pervasive and all parties
agree not to see the Axial Age. Here the technological and economic theoretical
constructs are forced to confront controversial ‘out of nowhere’ global
synchronous evolution, as in the emergence of many religions. We are left with a
fragment sequence, about which we can however reconstruct a great deal, and see
the vague outlines of its source in the Neolithic.
Let us restate again the
basic question, reverse engineered on the basis of the data. Does world history
show signs of general sequence? The question is ambiguous. The pure flow of time
is a sequence, and world history shows a host of sequences, but the results tend
to disorganization, as cultures proliferate. What we really seem to mean is,
does world history show signs of a sequence within a sequence, as intermittency,
that can advance the whole through the part? The answer is immediate, yes
indeed, however strange that may be. But we never see anything but the outcomes,
the surface. Let us mention once more what we have been cautious in mentioning,
a strange resemblance to noumenal/phenomenal distinction. We should be wary of
such a claim, but the symptoms are there, to suggest why we never see the core
mechanism. There is an unseen component in what the data is showing us. It even
drops a provocative hint of its relation to a basic antinomy. Let us insert
again our basic clue. This is not a ‘theory of freedom’, but a basic clue.
Notes: Economic
cycles: Economics is one of the few subjects that studies cycles in the
large in our sense. Our situation resembles that of the economist, who discovers
‘cycles’ through periodization, and whose models, discovered looking backwards,
must end in the present. Predictions may be possible up to a point, but free
action can always in principle falsify them. Note thus that a cyclical economic
dynamic changes its character in the present. This is the exact situation we
find ourselves in with our eonic model. However, it is not an economic question.
Looking backwards…
Economies are observed by a free agent looking backwards toward the past.
The agent is embedded in and subject to the cycles, and able to use his
observations to change them. Thus the mechanics of this dynamic becomes unstable
in the present. Momentum may overwhelm free choice, but in principle choice is
there. The past is a ‘might have been’, but now fact. This is the right exemplar
of our distinction of eonic determination and free action, here, economic
cyclical action and free agency.
Falsifiability Our
frequency hypothesis obviously allows falsifiability. But we have a problem with
the idea of ‘falsifiability’. We cannot use standard scientific methodologies,
on the grounds that esthetic and ethical judgments enter into the assessment of
our data. And teleological issues never enter the methodology. Still, it would
be useful to know if our frequency pattern really does have an earlier
continuation. Over time the issue should prove true or false. However, prior to
the invention of writing, the evidence density may never reach the required
level.
A ‘rebuttable thesis’
would be better than a ‘falsifiable theory’, to use Popper’s language. The
problem with falsifiability
is that
it is often used without sufficient awareness of the somewhat non-standard
methodology of science created by Popper. Whatever happened to
‘demonstrability’, in our case of a pattern crossing a threshold of evidence?
Further, these criteria are hopelessly ensnared in preconceived notions of what
reality is like, and take strong stances about facts and values. These are not
our own.
Further the term implies
we are doing a ‘science of history’. We are certainly trying, but the
assumptions of such a science are going to rapidly undergo a change. That change
was in fact foreseen by Popper and Isaiah Berlin who, in the heritage of Kant,
saw that freedom and necessity were a stumbling block for historical theories,
the idea of freedom being both essential and beyond science. Note in general
that a science of history
must
banish all values and find ‘laws’ operating blindly. But we have just dealt with
that issue. It won’t work. We see the bridge between facts and values in the
idea of freedom. Freedom means a potential to act in several ways, and the issue
of values arising in the different realizations of potential.
But when all is said and
done, our frequency hypothesis needs
confirmation or falsification, in our sense. Over time, the data arising might
be able to answer this question, which depends on finding short-term transitions
in earlier stages of history.
Spengler
and Toynbee Ideas of
cyclicity in relation to the historical process have a long history, as the
infamous confusions of the Great Year
make clear. The cyclical views of the
ancients are ritually denounced, although the nature of these views, and their
exact history, is not understood, because of the ‘linear view of history’ in the
early forms of monotheism, or more accurately in the codification of Augustine,
in reality the coin of Zarathustra
, changing hands in many transactions.
It is not quite true that the Hebraic gave birth to the
‘linear concept of time’, although it could well be claimed that the idea was
first honed to some implicit sharpness in the first period of Judaism. The
linear view of history was probably already present or emerging very early in Mesopotamia, if not earlier, but certainly appears
decisively in a remarkably sophisticated form in the teachings of Zarathustra,
that on inspection is a blended cycle-linear conception, as is that of Vico. But
their real appearance on the world stage began with their diffusion into the
world of emerging Judaism and the Persian
Empire after –600. This is a very
confusing subject indeed, for the impression of telescoped history is that a
cycle of religion
gives birth to an anti-cyclical view of
time.[i]
Cyclical theories are also the Eldorado of those who search
for the motor of history. It is not as foolish an idea, at root, as one might
think. Indeed we have a found the key, empirically. We should start over with
fresh terms. We are confronted with the recent, and actually less sophisticated
idea of the ‘cycle of civilization’. Even the Augustinian idea is better, for it
is in principle eonic. The idea of the ‘cycle of civilization’ was given new
life in this century by the works of Spengler and Toynbee. In fact,
cycles of time, as in the myths of the Great Year
, are different from the ‘dynastic cycles’ of the many Ecclesiastes, and are
inherently better than the ‘cycle of civilization’, which makes no sense, upon
close examination.[ii]
Spengler and Toynbee are really ideologists of conservative
postmodernism. In the closing period before
the onset of the Great War, whose disillusioning scale of destruction had left
an entire century of thought in a state of philosophic shell-shock, Spengler
prophesied the ‘decline of the West’ and produced a theory of
civilizations at the close of this war
whose foundations were never successfully
laid but whose cogent evocation of cycles drew attention to the large-scale
structures of history. What then is World History? he asks at the beginning of
his effort to understand the nature of civilization. The Nietzschean elements
seem almost like a wished for cultural sabotage, and the idea of a Faustian
civilization starting in the Year 1000 and entering decline in the Enlightenment
must be a garbled version of this idea of Nietzschean decadence.
The point for our analysis is that we have a cyclical
system that transcends the phenomenon of civilizations. Our eonic sequence
proceeds independently of the individual civilizations that it touches. Our
fundamental unit of analysis
is not therefore the civilization. It is
very doubtful if civilizations have the dynamic unity claimed by Spengler and
Toynbee, as our eonic analysis makes clear.
[i]
G. J. Whitrow in Time in History
(New York: Oxford, 1981) notes, p. 51, “It has for long been held that
our modern idea of time derives from that of early Christianity, which
in turn can be traced back to that of ancient
Israel
and Judaism. Instead of adopting the cyclical idea of time, the Jews are
said to have believed in a linear concept, based in their case on a
teleological idea of history as the gradual revelation of God’s purpose.
Although there is much to support this view of the origin of our modern
idea of time, it is now realized that it can only be adhered to with
some reservations.” Nicholas Campion, in
The Great Year (New York:
Arkana, 1995), p. 16, is especially critical of the work of Mircea
Eliade, in The Myth of the Eternal
Return (New York: Pantheon, 1954), for spreading the idea that the
Hebrews were the sole inventors of the ‘linear idea of time’, in
contradistinction to all others who adopted cyclical ideas.
[ii]
Oswald Spengler, The Decline of
the West (New York: Knopf, 1926), Arnold Toynbee,
A Study of History (New York:
Oxford, 1957), abridgement by D.C. Somervell. For a series of critiques
of Toynbee’s theory, cf. Toynbee and History (Boston: Porter Sargeant, 1956), Ashley Montagu
(ed.), Pieter Geyl, Debates With
Historians (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), Marvin Perry,
Arnold Toynbee and the Western
Tradition (New York: Peter Lang, 1996). Stuart Hughes,
Oswald Spengler (New York: Scribner, 1952). Arthur Herman, in
The Idea of Decline in Western
Culture (New York: The Free Press, 1996) traces the idea of cultural
pessimism, and its relation to theories of decline.
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