We are set to leapfrog into the future. We can note
here the frontier effect about to occur as Europe
is seeded and the Roman World expands to its limit in the European
sector, the source of the next advance, almost precisely at the limits
of expansion. It seems like there is a distinct ‘Western Civilization’
that is in some fashion doing one history but that is an illusion of
perspective. At this period Europe is a backward fringe area in the sequential zone of
the later Roman system. As such it begins to receive, finally, the rich
influences of the eonic sequence indirectly. It rises from its slumber
slowly but surely. Europe will be the last frontier diffusion zone left
in the Eurasian field,
Japan
being another such. But Europe is fortunate in so far as its medley of
tradition will inherit the output of two transit areas, the Judaic, and
the Greek, and its languages are a closer match to those traditions,
facilitating the spread of the Axial novelties.
The suggestion of the eonic sequence is return on
the far future (and the Zoroastrian theme senses this, but can never get
it right), and we are already in the modern period, as we find its seeds
as much in the dilemma of the Hellenistic, as in the economic
derivations of capitalism from Medieval Christendom. We have come to
another ‘what next?’ point. And we already know the answer, and,
further, see why students of the early modern are condemned to
equivocate the causality of the European resurgence. The modern period
is gestating just here, for system return after 2400 years in a jump
diffusion zone, i.e. at the fringes of the tide of expansion. There will
be few candidates. The Hellenistic passes into the Roman Empire, thence
at the boundary in Northern Europe we
find a zone both fed the great advance, and yet still virtually
untouched. Granting the dangers of ‘discrete
oversimplification’ as against
the sterility of ‘continuity models’, we are nonetheless drawn to the
strange conclusion that the rise of the modern shows ‘system return’ in
frequency, in a jump diffusion zone, as the ‘emergence zone’, this time
unique, for the great roll of eonic sequence
rolling out of the Neolithic. We
are back at our starting point, the rise of the West, as the next
response of eonic sequence to the Eurasian field.
Paul Kennedy
, at the beginning of The Rise and
Fall of the Great Powers, asks, “Why was it among the scattered and relatively
unsophisticated people inhabiting the western parts of the Eurasian
landmass that there occurred an unstoppable process of economic
development and technological innovation which would steadily make it
the commercial and military leader in world affairs?”[i]
We have the answer, and the question has already been asked for Archaic
Greece, and the other transitional areas. Thus the answer, in
part, has been to see the factor of periodization
beside the factor of eonic jump
diffusion, or the frontier effect, the takeoff in the open fringe, if
this has been balanced by good diffusion from the sources.
As of 1500 we see all the inheritor civilizations
of the classical phase in a state of convergent stabilization. The field
of civilization has reached the same point of ambiguous inertia evident
in the centuries before –900. We know what to expect. An untouched
extension, as it turns out, in the diffusion field of the Roman system,
will abruptly experience takeoff. Thus, find the areas adjacent to the
last advance, inside but near the edge of the field of diffusion,
sequential dependents as yet untouched by the eonic sequence.
Suitable frontier zones are few, Japan, Southeast Asia, Siberia, Europe, The New World?
One ironic fact is that Northeastern Europe, still
out of the eonic sequence, has benefited from strong sequential
dependency, and is really very ‘close’ to the great diffusion tracks of
both Sumer and the classical phase. No field could be as ready as Japan, but it is far from the
sequence center of gravity, and isolated. It is interesting and not
surprising that Japan
will suddenly and so easily move into the transitional network. In some
ways the Orient is more advanced, and one effect of our model is the
increasing difficulty of staging a relative transform against the whole.
And our account must distinguish the economic aspect from the cultural
in what we term the ‘modern’, creating a different account altogether.
In some ways Europe benefits from its backwardness, but has to cover a
lot of ground in a short time, as with Archaic Greece.
European history, in many ways, would seem a
mystery. Why did it take so long for it to enter the civilizational
nexus? It was always relatively close to the great centers of advance,
and yet remained relatively static, once reaching a Neolithic plateau,
until its ‘sequential’ entry in the period of the
Roman Empire. Already in the era of Egypt we see mysterious
stirrings of high barbarism that show rational and religious activity at
a high level based on solid foundations in the diffusion of the first
Neolithic that reaches Europe and stops, even as the Middle Eastern
sources and centers move quickly to higher plateaus. Two great
transformations come and go without triggering the passage to higher
civil integration via a transitional sourcing. But it receives the great
lessons of the ancients in a great vehicle of sequential generation,
medieval Catholicism, abetted by the contributions of the Islamic world.
[i]
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
(1988).