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At a time when theories of evolution
are under renewed controversy, discussion is hampered by the remoteness of the
phenomenon of evolution, and the use of indirect inference to speculate about
deep time. In the face of much criticism from religious Creationists, now
accompanied by the Intelligent Design
movement,
adherents of Darwinism forever defend a flawed theory that has been challenged
from its first appearance. The objections of the first reviewers of Darwin’s book, indeed even
of T. H. Huxley
, the original champion of the theory, were
never quite answered in the tide of paradigm change that swept modern culture.
The perennial issue is natural selection as the mechanism of evolution. The
assumption that evolution occurs, and must occur, at random is the crux of the
dispute, one unreasonably confused by the claims of religion versus science.[i]
The rise of molecular
biology
shows
a complexity of structure that cannot easily survive statistical challenges to
claims of random emergence. The new genetics and the emergence of developmental
biology have exposed the limits of
Darwin’s original theory, in the remarkable findings of
complex biochemical systems and evo-devo. Therefore the critics, whatever the
public pronouncements of Darwinists, have essentially won the debate, and
retabled the views of many of Darwin’s predecesssors at
the birth of embryology in the generation before
Origin. We might proceed on that basis, beyond the distracting
cultural politics of evolutionary theories, which
now
sees the resurfacing of the design theology of the generation of Paley. Nothing
in the methodology of science requires us to accept the claims of natural
selection as established.
The developmental perspective
Although the findings of so-called ‘evo-devo’ have already been grafted onto the
mythology of natural selection, they raise the question of developmental
interpretations of evolution, thence of natural teleology. As we examine
world history in light of the eonic effect, beginning in Chapter Two, a
developmental sequence unconnected with genetics emerges with a demonstration of
evolutionary directionality visible as macroevolution
over
five millennia. The representation of teleology as intermittent directionality
suddenly gives meaning to the idea of ‘punctuated equilibrium’.
The new developmental
perspective, although essentially genetic, strengthens once again our suspicion
of processes that go beyond the selectionist account. The problem is one of
observation. Evolution at close range is very difficult to observe. Darwinism
applies a universal generalization to unseen events and claims in advance of
demonstration that natural selection is the mechanism, frequently on the basis
of no observations at all. As if Newton
’s second law were taken forth from
physics, Darwinism assumes no differential transformations at short intervals
are to be found in the immense interstices of time they take for granted. Was
this a theory or the absence of one?[ii]
A new standard of observation Claims
for natural selection are all too conveniently pressed into service to cover
over the absence of close-range empirical data, and drive out considerations of
macroevolution, which might be difficult to observe. This certainly holds true
for human evolution, whatever the case for earlier eras of evolution. If we
discover high-speed macro processes in history that can produce totalized
cultural transformations at the level of centuries and less, witness the Axial
Age
, the Darwinian focus on selectionism is up
in the air at once. The true record of real evolution may have been lost
altogether. The observational standard for the Axial Age, a sub-pattern of the
eonic effect, is that of centuries or less.
Secular thought is
stuck in theoretical quicksand, harried between archaic religious teleologies,
or the argument by design
, and misapplied models of physical
reductionism. Issues of philosophic history, the ideological tangle of
nineteenth century evolutionism, and the struggle for scientific objectivity as
value neutrality, move to becloud even further all hopes of resolving the
ambiguity of evolutionary theories. The difficulty lies in the confusion over
conceptions of physical or natural law, applied to the biological domain, in the
search for universally valid generalizations. The entire realm of social theory
from historiography to politics and sociology is poorly informed by the
scientific literature, and is caught up in a biased discourse filled with subtle
confusion, if not outright disinformation.
The presentation of
the ‘scientific’ case on evolution is consistently rigged to show what it does
not and cannot show, and then applied aggressively as a standard to the
reductionist destruction of views the current regime of science wishes to decree
out of existence. Darwin’s
theory is taken as established far in advance of the evidence offered, and yet
one increasingly suspects it is wildly off the mark as to the descent of man.
With remarkable overconfidence, the theory of natural selection
is
claimed as the talisman of universal explanation, to resolve all the mysteries
of metaphysics. What is strange is the tenacity of easily challenged
assumptions, and that only fundamentalist religious groups seem aware of the
issues or able to challenge them.
These groups are now
joined by an immense proliferation of New Age
movements,
correctly suspicious that an entire dimension of man has been amputated from
consideration by a technocratic redefinition. Darwinists have too long enjoyed
the misleading luxury of debating fundamentalism, which throws everything into
confusion. Reductionist radicalism seems bent on the elimination of the entire
evolutionary psychology of man known for millennia. In fact, still another set
of fallacies is emerging under the category of ‘spiritual evolution’, with
highly metaphysical mythologies promoted in the propaganda for guruism. But such
traditions remind us the issues are wrongly posed between theists and scientific
reductionists. And ‘evolutionary naturalism’ has another history there, which
doesn’t fit into the ‘secular-sacred’ rubric emerging from the collision of
science with monotheism.
The basic issue is
that noone is under a truly scientific obligation, to take Darwin’s theory of natural selection as
established, or grounds for the blanket revision of all views of man and
culture. Back to square one: an operational hypothesis. Most importantly, this
is not the same as denying the ‘fact’ of evolution. But what are the facts
pertaining to the descent of man? We have a very weak empirical record here. Darwin’s oversimplification
succeeded as a bestseller, but a host of critics realized almost at once a
problem with the basic claims. And we now have the Darwin
book market where the calculation of dissent on sales causes amusingly
undisguised Darwin
prostration. This drives out clear exposition of the facts. New findings are
disguised behind Darwin
eulogies. Contradictory issues are finessed in double talk.
Nearly upstaged by
Alfred Wallace
,
Darwin
rushed into print, breaking the long delay in making his views public, all too
obviously obsessed, despite his clear doubts, with the need to seize his last
chance for priority, and none too sure his theory really held up. Publicity now,
doubts later, is the unconscious tactic of the author. Fudging doubts is evident
in the later editions of the text. The fact of evolution was already an
established claim, one needed that theory, credo-specific and general issue for
the troops, to consolidate one’s name, ‘my theory’. Forever after we are
beholden to this bizarre moment, and its displacement of Wallace. And Wallace,
to the permanent embarrassment of the iconic founder, had the intelligence and
honesty to see the limits of selectionist explanation applied to the descent of
man.[iii]
The Neo-Darwinian
Synthesis
is
the second round of these tactics. By the end of the nineteenth century
Darwinism was almost in eclipse, until the rise of the Mendelism, followed by
the new mathematical population genetics
. The models used here are of interest in
their own right, but hardly constitute a foundational theory. The appearance of
scientific rigor in population genetics
tends to confuse the issue all over again
in the claims for these useful but limited models the educated public tends to
take on faith, reserving judgment to experts. This added complexity, based on
random variation and genetic drift, is the new cover for the old universal
claims. Sometimes random variation is paired with non-random natural selection
to
produce directionality, but this is misleading, and not the same as non-random
evolution. We are to suppose without proof that this theory explains human
consciousness, language, and morality, and much else. The theory is so heavily
promoted we forget how implausible its extensions are.[iv]
In the realm of
physics the use of mathematics is a triumph, but in the realm of biology it
might be under suspicion at once for a failure to model a qualitative aspect.
Bogus models have long since been critiqued in mathematical economics, but
Neo-Darwinian theory seems exempt. A population
of organisms over time is an immensely complex system, one that can defy
intuition. The observation of such a stream is very difficult. To claim that the
evolution of such an entity is fully explained by random variation and natural
selection without a closely tracked dataset is simply gross extrapolation,
leaving one puzzled by the violation of correct procedure in such a simplistic
reductionism. Such a theory is of the same order of difficulty as a science of
history where these population streams are clearly visible. Here the encounter
with historical fact enforces a reality check, and demonstrates at once systems
of far greater complexity than anything dreamed of by current science. Is this a
foundational science, like Newton’s physics? Is natural selection a
‘force’, or the lack of one, in a foundational theory?
We should note that
the realm of population genetics is not of the same character as basic physics.
And here manipulations of the formalism of theory are no guarantee of correct
foundations. No amount of technical knowledge can easily resolve the ambiguity
because it requires a gestalt change with respect to reductionist thinking and a
new basic methodology, with an understanding different from that found in the
calculations of numerical models. The acumen of many of the most intelligent
technical experts has been crippled by wrong education. And the fringes of
knowledge do not easily produce the ombudsmen required to sort through the
fallacies of expert delusion.
In general, scientists
tend to assume that the spectacular successes of mathematical physics (and the
heroic episodes of the Galileo in the drama of secularization) will be repeated
in all fields. Yet this expectation has not been born out by the facts, which
record a very poor showing for science in the realm of the psychological and the
social sciences. Science has not achieved any of its theoretical objectives in
any of the human sciences. The rote Darwinization of all domains results over
and over in a species of shoddy pseudo-science. In fact, this confusion is
nothing new, and we already see the reaction at the end of the eighteenth
century. The attempts to define the interaction of the human and natural
sciences has a rich tradition, one now almost forgotten in the short memory of
resurgent positivistic science. Over and over Darwinism is given as the
justification to invade the social sciences, and yet the claims are a promissory
note based on a demonstrably inadequate theory.
The stubborn
persistence of the Darwin
debate
is
therefore no mystery, and is not the result of Creationist conspiracy. The rise
of Darwinism has produced a false view of man, we see the long-predicted limits
of the modern scientific worldview. It is easy, in the case of Darwinism, to see
this if we explore the limits of theory, for example, in the realm of ethics or
esthetics. Beyond that lies the immense realm of ‘potential man’ clearly
recorded in traditions such as those of the classic Buddhist sutras. Hardly a
single reference to such discourse occurs, or is allowed, in scientific
literature, a clear sign of institutional agenda. Adaptationist scenarios of the
Darwinian type must endure a reality check here, yet the illusion induced by the
all-explanatory theory is so ingrained none see the discordance as even odd. The
claim by narrowly specialized scientists to a methodology that can pass judgment
on all questions, sight unseen, in a hierarchy of credentialed expertise has
become a strategy of social domination enforcing a worldview that most are
forced to disregard in private and assent to in public.
In a nutshell, there
is, as yet, no methodologically sound basis for a theory of evolution. That’s a
surprising statement, but the point will become obvious as we look at the gray
area between history and evolution. We should recall the reservations of Kant,
as to the hope ‘that one day there would arise a second Newton who would make
intelligible the production of a single blade of grass in accordance with the
laws of nature the mutual relations of which were not arranged by some
intention’. Darwin’s
theory, at least, does not resolve such doubt.[v]
The metaphysics of evolution
The philosophy of Kant offers a
useful benchmark for the examination of evolutionary theories as these impinge
on the intractable issues of metaphysics. Questions, he warns, of god, soul or
self, and free will are destined to exhibit antinomies that will haunt any
universal generalization. We have the
Darwin
debate in a nutshell, and can see at once that Darwinian natural selection, used
as the universal talisman of metaphysical reduction, presumes judgment on
unobserved totalities, and is troubled on each of these questions. Questions of
divinity founder in the design debate, of soul in the basic definition of self
and organism, and free will in the attempts to reduce moral action to the
mechanization of adaptationism. Current biology lacks so much as a basic
definition of the organism.
A clue to the problem
lies in the failure to produce a science of history
, where the facts are visible, even as
Darwinists claim a science of evolution, where the facts are not visible. And at
what point do we divide history
from
evolution? This situation is altogether odd, and we left suspicious Darwinism is
failing a photo finish test
. Not a single hard result has ever been
achieved for a science of history. That should make us suspicious of Darwinian
claims at the onset. We indulge in far too much idle talk about evolutionary
theory in the abstract. These discussions are impoverished, but brilliant
sounding speculations about something we never observe. It’s time to take a
long, slow motion look at the one good data set that we have, world history. We
will soon be cured of Darwinian fantasies. The scale of evolution is tremendous.
Even the record of world history, five thousand years over the whole surface of
a planet, is nothing compared to deep time. That is a reality check. We see at
once the fallacy of throwing generalizations at such a complex system. It is
primitive behavior.
A science of history? The question of
a science of history provokes a contradiction as an antinomy of causality and
freedom: in the stance of science, there
must be a science of history, but in the consideration of freedom there
cannot be a science of history. This
variant of a classic Kantian antinomy is resolved in a dialectic that ‘somehow’
unites both thesis and antithesis, and bursts asunder the limits of space-time
in the context of a discovered analog to ‘transcendental idealism
’, the classic companion to Newtonianism.
If we connect this to our question, when did evolution stop and history
begin?
we can precipate the same antinomy for earlier ‘evolution’. The Darwinian
framework is inadequate for this situation. As we will see there
can be a science of history: this
requires an evolutionary basis, and a mediation of causality and freedom
together, a strange requirement, one most surprisingly satisfied, and very
exactly, by the data of the eonic effect
. We must connect history and evolution in
a new way, and this can be found if we pursue a ‘science of freedom’, in the
resolution of the paradox of determinism. We can bring evolution into history by
asking still another paradoxical question, Has man become ‘homo
sapiens’ yet, by ‘evolving freedom’ (according to various definitions of
freedom)? If man is ‘not yet free’ the ‘evolving freedom’ must show a macro
aspect, otherwise, as his freedom evolves, man’s self-evolution will become a
micro process, exiting from evolution in our Great Transition. In fact, as we
discover the eonic effect we see that nature provides us with the elegant and
simple solution to these enigmas of the descent of humans. We will adopt a
rubric of ‘self-consciousness’ as the intermediate transitional category,
compatibalist with respect to causality and freedom.
A Science of Freedom? The idea of a
‘science of freedom’ emerged in the wake of the Kantian critique of metaphysics.
We can easily establish that, while such a science is not easily attainable, the
idea itself is at least coherent, and can be approached empirically. As an
example consider the relationship of a computer with a GUI and a user. The
tandem system, computer/user, is a relationship of the user’s options and the
computer’s (deterministic) program. We must analyze a combined system in which
the field of the user’s options and its relationship to a larger system must be
studied together. The eonic model discovers such a system in
historical/evolutionary terms.
Looking at history we
can easily show where Darwinian theory is going wrong. The relationship of
history and evolution creates a paradox, and placing the two in conjunction
allows us to infer something about earlier evolution. The quest for a science of
history is now beginning to overflow from Darwinian confusion as a reductionist
tactic for the social sciences in the claims of sociobiologists, ambitious to
dismiss all other forms of discourse. It seems like a welcome mistake, a
foolhardy gesture we can applaud! Just at that point we do have facts, facts
that can stop Darwinist thinking in its tracks, and in the process discipline
the current confusions.
[i]
Ernst Mayr, One Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of
Modern Evolutionary Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1991), F. Hoyle & N. Wickramasinghe,
Evolution From Space (London:
Dent, 1981), Robert Reid,
Evolutionary Theory, The Unfinished Synthesis (New York: Cornell,
1985), Robert Wesson, Beyond
Natural Selection (Cambridge: MIT, 1991), Michael Denton,
Evolution: A Theory in Crisis
(New York: Adler & Adler, 1985), William Dembski, No Free Lunch
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), Lee Spetner, Not By Chance
(New York: Judaica Press, 1998), Robert Behe,
Darwin’s Black Box (New York:
Free Press, 1996). Stuart Kauffman, At Home in the Universe (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
A useful critical history of Darwinism can be found in
Soren Lovtrup, Darwinism: Refutation of a Myth (New York: Croom
Helm, 1987). Lovtrup notes, “I suppose that nobody will deny that it is
a great misfortune if an entire branch of science becomes addicted to a
false theory. But this is what has happened in biology: for a long time
now people discuss evolutionary problems in a peculiar ‘Darwinian’
vocabulary—‘adaptation’, ‘selection pressure’, ‘natural selection’,
etc,—thereby believing that they contribute to the explanation of
natural events. They do not, and the sooner this is discovered, the
sooner we shall be able to make real progress in our understanding of
evolution. I believe that one day the Darwinian myth will be ranked the
greatest deceit in the history of science. When this happens many people
will pose the question: How did this ever happen?" Soren Lovtrup,
Darwinism: Refutation of a Myth, p. 422.
[ii]
Sean Carroll et al., From DNA to Diversity (New York: Blackwell,
2001), Rudolf Raff, The Shape of Life (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1996), J. Gerhart & M. Kirschner, Cells, Embryos, and
Evolution (New York: Blackwell, 1997), Jeffrey Schwarz, Sudden
Origins (New York: Wiley, 1999), G. Miller & S. Newman,
Origination of Organismic Form (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002).
[iii]
Arnold
Brackman, A Delicate Arrangement (New York: Times Books, 1980), Michael
Shermer, Darwin's
Shadow: The Life and Science of Alfred Russell Wallace (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002).
[iv]
Peter Bowler, The Eclipse of Darwinism (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1983). John Endler, Natural Selection in the Wild
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 31, D. Hartl & A.
Clark, Principles of Population Genetics (Sunderland, Mass.:
Sinauer Associates, 1997).
[v]
W. S. Korner, Kant (London: Penguin, 1955), p.197. I. Kant,
Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernhard (New York: Macmillan,
1951), p. 258. For the teleomechanists, see Timothy Lenoir, The
Strategy of Life (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982).
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