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The most confusing aspect of the study of evolution is the
nature of the first step, natural selection. The debate over evolution
tends to degenerate into a conflict of
science and religion, deflecting our attention from the basic problem with
Darwin’s theory: the limits of selectionist explanation
with their ‘Just So Stories’, or adaptationist scenarios. It is very convenient
for Darwinists to confront Creationist critics who tend to reject the fact of
evolution. This deflects attention from the real problem. In the final analysis
the proposition of natural selection would seem implausible. The original
criticisms of the first generation of
Darwin
critics in many ways still stand.
T. H. Huxley himself,
ironically, warned Darwin
on the eve of publication of the problem with natural selection.
The intractable character of the debate is no mystery and arises from the
violation of the limits of observation, Karl Popper famous ‘metaphysical
research program’.[i]
In general, severe, almost certainly fatal, mathematical
challenges have always stood in the way of selectionist assumptions. In a now
classic text, Evolution From Space, Hoyle and Wickramasinghe give
one version of this objection.
Darwinian evolution is most unlikely to get even one
polypeptide right, let alone the thousands on which living cells depend for
their survival. This situation is well known to geneticists and yet nobody seems
prepared to blow the whistle on the theory.[ii]
This viewpoint has been ‘refuted’ so many times that we
forget genetic research has essentially confirmed it with the discovery of new
developmental structures and processes. The full random run is in fact
‘compressed’ by the existence of some other process of development. In general,
we must be wary of statistical reasoning applied to evolution. Even the
suspicion of a directional process will throw any calculations here out of
kilter. The amount of sophistry attempting to counter Hoyle, strewn over the
Internet, is remarkable. Current thinking has quietly shifted to claims for the
emergence of some ‘evolutionary toolkit’. Now it is claimed this arises
by chance alone.
The literature critiquing natural selection is
considerable, and we will assume some familiarity with such. A number of classic
studies beggar the idea that all critics are religiously motivated. Beside Soren
Lovtrup’s Darwinism: Refutation of a Myth, we have Robert Reid’s
Evolutionary Theory, The Unfinished
Synthesis, where the author notes, “I thought my failure to understand selection theory fully
was the result of the specialization of the subject beyond my simple
comprehension. Confident that every aspect of natural selection was for the
best, I little knew that it had long been criticized for just that Panglossian
felicity”. In Beyond Natural
Selection, Robert Wesson gives a naturalist’s second opinion of the
gritty details that mount up and cast a shadow on the Neo-Darwinian Synthesis, noting, “Natural selection is
credited with seemingly miraculous feats because we want an answer and have no
other. There probably cannot be another general answer. Biologists, it seems,
must do without a comprehensive theory of evolution.” Wesson summons up an
impressive list of oddities that current theories simply disregard. Simple
things, like the absence of selective advantage in dreaming, the failure of
sexual selection in practice to feedforward intelligence, the six-leggedness of
insects, a host of discrepancies. “Many very simple facts, such as that all the
millions of species of insects, and no species of non-insects have six legs,
might well might well be considered to disprove natural selection as a
generalization.”[iii]
As S. Kauffman notes
in At Home in the Universe,
“Since Darwin, we turn to a single, singular force, Natural
Selection, which we might well capitalize as though it were the new deity.
Random variation, selection-sifting. Without it,
we reason, there would be nothing but incoherent disorder. I shall argue in this
book that this idea is wrong. For, as we shall see, the emerging sciences of
complexity begin to suggest that the order is not all accidental, that vast
veins of spontaneous order lie at hand. Laws of complexity spontaneously
generate much of the order of the natural world. It is only then that selection
comes into play, further molding and refining.”
[iv]
We are still without a theory of evolution, in part because
we have never observed its mechanics in action, confused by the superficial
surface of evolution, selection-sifting.
Historical
counter-evidence Debates over natural selection are mostly repetitive
propaganda exchanges. The debate revolves around a set of abstractions. But a
picture is worth a thousand words. It can help to examine a rich data set such
as that of the eonic effect in order to see how misleading the claims for
natural selection can be. We soon discover that natural selection is often
counter-evolutionary, and can lead to degradation of evolutionary forms. A close
look at world history shows that the fittest survivors are a problem historical
evolution is required to solve.
[i]
Sherrie Lyons, Thomas Henry Huxley (New York: Prometheus, 1999),
p. 231. Soren Lovtrup, Darwinism: Refutation of a Myth (New York:
Croom Helm, 1987), Robert Reid,
Evolutionary Theory, The Unfinished Synthesis (New York: Cornell,
1985), Robert Wesson, Beyond
Natural Selection (Cambridge: MIT, 1991), Michael Denton,
Evolution: A Theory in Crisis
(New York: Adler & Adler, 1985), Kevin Kelly,
Out of Control (New York:
Addison-Wesley, 1994), Stephen J. Gould, The Structure of
Evolutionary Theory, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002),
Mark Kirschner & John Gerhart, The
Plausibility of Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
Popper’s essay, “Darwinism as a Metaphysical Research Program”, can be
found in his intellectual biography, Unended Quest, (New York:
Open Court, 1976).
[ii]
Cf. F. Hoyle & N. Wickrmasinghe,
Evolution From Space (London:
Dent, 1981), p. 148.
[iii] Robert Wesson,
Beyond Natural Selection (Cambridge: MIT, 1994), p. xii.
[iv]
Stuart Kauffman, At Home in the Universe (New York: Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 8.
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