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Looking backward, world history shows the unexpected
evidence of a non-random pattern, one that we should naturally call
‘evolution’. We simply assume the flow of world history follows random
logic, conditioned as we are by Darwinism. Yet the rapid growth of archaeological knowledge since the nineteenth century
is moving to falsify this assumption and has greatly expanded our views of the
emergence of civilization and, significantly, crossed a threshold of five
thousand years, the bare minimum interval, we are about to see, for grasping the
logic of historical evolution. Such a non-random process is the clue to
something going on at a deeper level. The pattern itself suggests a
developmental sequence of self-organization at work, something that is
‘climbing
Mt.
Improbable’. Indeed, we should call this ‘evolution’. This ‘evolution’, on
reflection, must be connected in some fashion to earlier stages of human
evolution. A non-random pattern on this scale shows us something missing in
Darwinian thinking and falls into the category of ‘evolution’, ‘evolution of some kind’, with a question, What is the meaning of
evolution?
We can easily prove the point by simply laying out a
careful timeline. World history since the invention of writing shows an exact
systematics, often down to the decade, an unnerving warning about earlier
periods with less data. If we examine this pattern of developmental emergence
and connect its timeline with man’s earlier evolution, we realize that they
must be connected. We are suddenly suspicious that a process like what we see in
world history is present, but invisible in the earlier phases of human
evolution. We begin to suspect that we need a ‘centuries-level standard’,
evidence at very close range to detect what is really driving evolution.
Paleolithic
Current evidence distinguishes anatomically and behaviorally ‘modern’
man, the first appearing ca. 200,000 years ago, the second in the period after
-100,000, with the remarkable threshold, often called the Great Explosion,
somewhere between -100,000 to -50,000, associated we are to suppose with various
‘Out of Africa’ scenarios. Darwinists are determined to ignore this
phenomenon, but the evidence makes no sense as slow evolution.
Was
there a ‘Great Explosion’? The evidence points to a sudden crossing of a
threshold. Once we see our historical pattern in action this sudden passage
begins to make sense, because we can see that something more than natural
selection is operating in a relatively short period of time, possibly in
intervals of five to ten thousand years. We see, in any case, that world history
is an instance of a ‘great explosion’, the rapid emergence of civilization
over ten millennia. We strongly suspect this ‘evolution of civilization’ is
related to the earlier evolution of man.
At the very least in the debates over
fast and slow evolution, we seem forced to conclude that many of the behavioral
characteristics of a new species appear quickly. Both slow and fast evolution
are occurring overlaid, please note. But these periods of rapid emergence are
completely beyond the range of our emerging historical standard, the
‘centuries level’, and we can only wait for further research to confirm or
falsify this emerging but fuzzy picture of the suspiciously sudden appearance of
homo sapiens. The obvious
resemblance of the phenomenon of the so-called Great Explosion to the eonic
effect leaves an immediate question mark for Darwinian claims, or plaintive
hopes, that some lucky mutation suddenly appears to accompany the seeming fait
accompli of a hominid so accomplished in language, art, religion, and the
elements of ‘technical ingenuity’ that will transform the nature of cultural
evolution. As we study the eonic effect, we will begin to see what we are
probably missing. We suddenly realize we have a demonstration of how the earlier
rapid evolution might have occurred!
The Neolithic A
relatively static period ensues until, in the interstices of the various Ice Age
rhythms, human cultural evolution begins to take off with the discovery of
agriculture. Man emerges from the Paleolithic and by sometime around -8000 we
see the Neolithic underway. Our non-random process probably begins, or restarts
here, but even this early Neolithic still fails our ‘centuries level’
test. This is the true beginning of ‘civilization’, in the progression,
village, town, city, and we arrive at the emergence of complex states, often
called the ‘rise of civilization’. It is probably in this era, incidentally,
that we are to find the birth of ‘religion’ in the later sense of what we
see as the ‘world religions’. Five thousand years separate the onset of the
Neolithic and the rise of higher civilization. We are drawn to a distinction
between the ‘discovery of agriculture’, a technological advance, one that
may or may not have happened independently several times, and the crystallizing
cultural formations that transform Paleolithic man as he enters into an entirely
new stage of social evolution. And this is related to the fact that the prime
focus of the Neolithic lies in the Fertile Crescent of the
Middle East
. In fact, the remarkable technological complexity of irrigation societies that
we see in the coming world of the Sumerians is already an advanced descendant of
these earlier advances.
A Non-random Pattern Now
we come to the remarkable pattern that we will call the eonic effect, visible
since the invention of writing: three periods in a row of rapid transition,
equally spaced, inside the slower current of world history, relatively static by
comparison. We can see world civilization divide into three epochs driven at the
start by rapid advance. Three complex transitions ca. 2400 years apart fret the
whole of world history. This pattern is a complete giveaway: it shows an exact
developmental sequence of a special kind in a series of selected regions that
demonstrate ‘transitions’ to a new stage of civilization. These areas then
advance the whole by diffusion.
Mystery ‘Force X’ We
commented before on the necessity to consider the ‘force of evolution’, in
any sense, and our pattern betrays such a ‘force’ (we may not use that word)
very directly. Careful accounting of time-periods shows us almost by definition
the mysterious ‘evolutionary driver’ operating behind the scenes, visible in
the clear sequence of sudden surges of advance. It is probable we are missing
the earlier stages of this in the Neolithic.
Rise of higher civilization Suddenly around the end of the third
millennium we see what is conventionally called the ‘rise of (higher)
civilization’ in the dramatic, and synchronous emergence of the Sumerian and
Egyptian complexes. Note the confusing way that two mainlines appear in
parallel, a phenomenon we will see frequently, especially in the next so-called
Axial Age. These two civilizations cross a threshold into a stage of higher
social complexity, indicated by the scale of their social and political
formation. They will prove the dynamic sources for millennia in the oikoumenes
or diffusion fields that they generate. We had thought that this was an ad
hoc advance based on contingent factors as described in the various
unsuccessful theories attempting to explain the phenomenon (e.g. Toynbean
‘challenge and response’). But in fact we detect an element of timing in a
process that has a mysterious ‘scheduling’ or cyclical period, the clue to
some kind of developmental sequence in the large. Notable among a host of
innovations is the invention of writing, the beginning of the historical record,
and here we detect the beginnings of our non-random pattern. Three times in a
row we will see this phenomenon of three or so centuries of sudden advance, the
achievement of a plateau that is never matched by its immediate successors which
are relatively static or even moving into ‘medieval’ decline. Nothing in
this gainsays prior slow development. Slow and fast evolution are both the case,
overlaid. But the sudden jump to a new social formation has always been a
puzzle, and we will see that to our surprise the timing is non-random. Here is
where we find the resolution of the Axial paradox. The Axial Age is simply the
next in our series of such sudden jumps, transitions, or turning points. But it
adds a new twist: sudden development is a series of parallel transitions across
Eurasia (a close look shows a similar effect in the previous case, Sumer
and Egypt).
Transition 1 We are
really talking about the emergence of complex forms of the State. This occurs in
the centuries before and around -3000, and we have the invention of writing, and
the sudden onset of two classic advanced civilizations, Dynastic Egypt and the
world of Sumer. Two (relative) starts in parallel. This period is conventionally
described as the ‘rise of civilization’, although the slow transition,
village, town, city that defines the Neolithic is all too obviously an earlier
stage of gestating ‘civilization’. But a new threshold of human social
complexity clearly comes into existence very rapidly at the end of the third
millennium BCE. This could be seen as ‘state formation’. This initial burst
of advances rapidly becomes fixed in place until the next phase. Nothing can
quite match the creative phase of early Sumerian city-states, and the large
oikoumenes generated show the drift into empire formation that characterizes the
coming centuries. The world of Egypt
produces its theocratic state and then remains almost frozen in place for two
millennia. This transitional period generates an immense diffusion field across
Eurasia
, and we can clock the rise of complex states almost in proportion to distance
and time in the wake of this phase: the Indic and Chinese systems are underway
within a millennium. This period is still a bit murky, just on the threshold of
our centuries-level test. We can see that slow and fast evolution are reconciled
in practice. Both are true. And we realize why we are unclear how to refer to
the ‘rise of civilization’. It has been rising since the Neolithic. We are
referring to the sudden transition that takes place in our eonic series. This
point becomes clearer as we examine the next phase, the Axial Age.
Transition 2 The
next rapid burst is the so-called Axial Age, from around -900 to -400, the
period from -900 to -600 being the real generative period. Around a center of
gravity ca. -600 we have the beginnings of our classical traditions, the world
of the Greeks, the core Old Testament and its Prophets, the world of Buddha and
Confucius. We see independent sourcing areas suddenly undergoing transformation
in synchronous timing. From this period springs the constellation of great
traditions that lay the foundations not only for ‘western’ civilization, but
the civilizations of
India
, China. The Axial Age can be confusing because of its wide dispersion of effects
from
Rome
to China. But this is because we think in terms of ‘civilizations’ while our pattern
respects and acts only in relation to short intervals of action, and their
subsequent diffusion fields. The areas that respond in Axial phenomenon already
lie in the wake of the diffusion field from the first transition.
The phenomenon of the Axial Age is so spectacular and occurs at such high
speed, within ca. three centuries, that our confidence in earlier theories about
human or other evolution plummets. The Axial Age shows a series of independently
parallel emerging zones of advance.
The diversity of the Axial
Age is remarkable and we see not only the birth of two world religions, but of
the world’s first democracy, and the first Scientific Revolution in Greece. We cannot ascribe this phenomenon to slow evolution. There are no sociological
antecedents that can explain this phenomenon, the more so as it is independently
emerging in unconnected regions simultaneously.
Note that the Israelites
had a sense of this phenomenon, but localized to their own cultural world. The
confusion of emergent theism and historical transformation has made it difficult
for us to discuss the question of the Axial Age, since it is (not surprisingly)
confused with an ‘age of Revelation’. We should note that the Israelites
were reluctant to speak of divinity, preferring abstractions such as IHVH. We
must confront the fact that a sense of design arises in relation to the
phenomenon of the Axial Age. But on reflection and close examination we begin to
see that the sense of design yields to the sense of a complex system at work,
one of evolutionary potential.
This period reaches a
plateau, as innovation becomes less intense, and in fact many of the innovations
die out as this period wanes rapidly and we enter period of the Occidental Roman
Empire and its long decline, followed by what we call the Middle Ages.
We could almost guess the
next step in the series. The only period that resembles the Axial transition is
the sudden rise of the modern.
Transition 3 It is
the realization that modernity is connected to all this that is the surprising
fitting together of the last piece of the puzzle of world history. Thus, once
again quite suddenly we see the remarkable rise, with uncanny timing, of the
modern world, a great take-off about 1500. This is not the same as the
so-called Renaissance, nor is it slow evolution from the Middle Ages (which is
present in any case). In three centuries starting in the sixteenth century the
world system is transformed and reaches a new level of civilization and cultural
organization. It seems as if many of the processes of the Axial period suddenly
revive and echo in the modern transition: another rise of science, another
democratic revolution. All at once we realize that the progression from the
Axial period into a protracted medievalism, followed by the sudden rise of the
modern world, is no accident. It is part of the precise timing of our mysterious
pattern. We have become hopelessly confused by the question of Eurocentrism and
so-called ‘Western Civilization’ in discussions of the modern world. But as
we study the eonic effect as a whole we will discover its various properties,
among them a kind of ‘frontier effect’, whereby each of our transitions
moves to the exterior frontier of its prior diffusion. The confusions of
Eurocentrism are a distraction. We see that our pattern exploits a transition
region for its renewal, and always from the fringes of its previous action, the
obvious explanation for the Euro-centered transition area. The emergence of
modernity at the fringes of
Eurasia
is thus a side effect of the overall pattern. The period from 1500 to 1800 is
the crucial transitional interval, a claim that clarifies at one stroke the
confusions of historical dynamics mixed with modern/postmodern distractions. We
should note that each of our transitions occurs in a staging area, whence its
effect spreads by diffusion in a process of globablization. The Euro-centered
staging area of modernity is thus explained by its place in our eonic series,
along with the remarkable insight that historical evolution is occurring on two
levels, in a global process that acts on the whole via a series of local parts.
This
mysterious drumbeat hides an unsuspected dynamism and answers directly to the
enigma of the evolution
of human civil existence in a series
of discrete
periods. We have used the term
‘punctuation’ for a reason: the phenomenon gives us an almost perfect
representation of ‘punctuated equilibrium’, and shows us a genuine instance
of some form of ‘macroevolution’, if we can understand the relationship of history and evolution. In fact,
‘punctuated disequilibrization’ might also describe the phenomenon, since
the effect is to rouse a steady state into a dynamic one. This usage of the term
‘punctuated equilibrium’ has little to do with prior definitions, so we
could take the term as if coined from scratch. It shows what a real
‘punctuated equilibrium’ process is like in an actual instance seen at close
range.
A closer look, in the arduous inquiries at deeper zoom
levels, reveals the need to revise assumptions of historical continuity with a
balanced conception of discontinuity. These discontinuities are unmistakable and
are especially clear in the period ca. -900 to -600 of the extraordinary
synchronous emergence of the classical traditions. Suddenly, in
China
,
India
, the Middle East and Greece, the forms of culture undergo a cultural acceleration
in a synchronous parallelism that is
quite mysterious. Everything seems done in a flash. The world of Classical
Greece flowers, and, like an apparition, the moment is gone. Israel
sees its age of the Prophets, the Exile, and the emergence of a new religious matrix. In
India
and China, we find the same, in a period that produces the seminal foundations for a
whole era. For centuries to come men look back at this era. The monuments of the
earlier age of Egypt
and
Mesopotamia
fall into oblivion and disappear in sand. The discontinuity is not a gap, far
from it, it is a clustering of innovations, a packed field of sudden creative
advances over a brief interval of history.
A
Strategy of Globalization Our pattern can be confusing at first, but on
reflection makes complete sense: it moves in parallel and redundant failsafe
streams, which become multiple in the Axial Age, to embrace diversity, then the
process contracts at the end in the modern transition, obviously because
imminent
globalization requires a single focus. This pattern shows a clear strategic
element.
This
synchronism
began to be observed in the
nineteenth century, but has failed to become well known, for the nature of its
dynamic is difficult to pinpoint, and it controversially forces us to revise our
views of the Great Religions. This reluctance to see the Axial effects is not
surprising, since we are talking about fields of free activity that show
structure over a period of centuries, a seeming contradiction. But the evidence
can’t be denied. This synchronism implies the discontinuous temporal phase is the crucial determinant,
independently of any continuous runway leading to the sudden flowerings of
individual areas. Causal continuity is clearly violated. It is hard to
reconstruct, let alone visualize, the correct sequence of emergence. We see the
peaks stand out, great religious founders, art, philosophers, new political
forms, then a distinct fall-off. But the overall picture is clear. Its
implications indicate that cultural evolution
is, so to speak, hyper-cultural in a
generalized system of evolutionary emergence, an extraordinary fact, and the one
great clue to evolution in action.
The
modern transition: a model It is useful to consider the modern example,
which is fully visible in detail, as a model for the earlier transitions. We see
that a statistical region of three centuries expresses an intermittent action
that ratchets to a new level of culture. This three-centuries interval has a
conclusion, or ‘divide’ point, clearly visible in the modern case. This
modern example can help us to understand what is happening in the previous
cases.
It has often been noticed, as in this instance, that the
record of human history shows a strange patchwork of fast advances, and slower
periods that are relatively static. This fact alone should alert us to the
existence of historical dynamism. Our use of the term ‘medieval’ is quite
revealing in this regard. We call the period from the fall of the
Roman Empire
until modern times a ‘middle age’. This ‘middleness’ is a clue to how we in fact take our own history, not
quite sure why, although we can see that the source of this earlier world lies
in the onset of the classical age, many centuries before. This era rose to a
height that was never matched until after 1500. The same relationship is now
visible in the era prior to this, at the birth of complex civilization. The
obvious suggestion is that discrete
and continuous processes are blended
in the context of a macrohistorical system, if we can define it. We will use the
term ‘mideonic’ to refer to the intervals in full between our turning
points.
The rise of
civilization from the Neolithic takes place quickly around the end
of the fourth millennium, in
Egypt
and Sumer. This is followed by the long eras that characterize these distinct forms of
culture, more or less set in their pattern. Then, in the centuries just before
-600 we find civilization on the move again, this time, as noted, in a broad
field of rapid parallel advance. Another period of take-off this time in widely
separated areas, suddenly transforms the whole basis of civilization. Then
finally the rise of the modern shows its hand as the next descendant in this
suddenly obvious series. But the spottiness of the pattern is not at first
amenable to any simple explanation, in part because we have no prior grounds of
explanation at all.
The worlds of Archaic Greece, the Hebrew Prophets, the Upanishadic era of
India, and the centuries before Confucius in China suddenly emerge simultaneously. From
this we can infer the presence of a larger system doing cross-sections, one on a
scale greater than its manifestations as individual civilizations. It is hard to
imagine how this could be until suddenly we notice the coordination of this
system over millennia. It defies all odds of being random, and finds its oddities from the inherent nature of large-scale culture
evolving on the surface of a planet.
We are confronted with a strange pattern, obviously
incomplete, and no doubt sourcing in the Neolithic or before, whose real
symptoms are clearest at the sources of our traditions. Thus, if we consider
this classical era in detail, it becomes evident that it represents a phase in a
greater sequence. The birth of civilization, and the rise of the modern world,
for three centuries after the Reformation, show the same absolute high-speed emergentist structure in phase, and are
clearly related in an overall dynamic of such transition
al phases. These three periods, and only these, show this ‘order of
magnitude’ explosion, although the genesis of Islam comes close. This does
not include the period after 1800, or license any ideological conclusion
some might derive from our purely theoretical argument. Beside this parallelism,
then, the long sequence of civilization begins to reveal as a whole this overall
hyper-cultural generative structure. Thus we can see, in addition, the inner
coherence of all of these periods as a unified system whose realizations we call
‘civilizations’.
In summary, world history since the invention of writing
suddenly stands in contradiction to all basic assumptions about random
evolution. This pattern can be seen from two aspects:
1.
The first is of the so-called Axial Age, the enigmatic synchronous emergence of
cultural innovations and advances across Eurasia in the period of the Classical
Greeks and early Romans, the Prophets of Israel, the era of the Upanishads and
Buddhism in
India, and Confucius in China. This data shows us that an ‘evolutionary something’ stands behind the
emergence of complex forms of culture, is global in scale, and operates over an
interval of several centuries to redirect the course of civilization.
2.
The second, related to the first, is of a drumbeat sequence of punctuations or
transitions proceeding down a mainline of the diversity of civilizations.
Looking at the Axial phenomenon we are forced to consider that it is part of a
larger pattern, and is a step in a sequence. Moving backwards and forwards we
suddenly discover the full pattern. These punctuation points are, remarkably,
equally spaced, with an interval of about 2400 years, evidence of a cyclical
phenomenon. We thus have three turning points or transitions several centuries
in length which we can call ‘turning points or transitions 1, 2, 3’,
or TP1, TP2, TP3.
Transition
1 The birth of the state, appearance of writing, onset of Dynastic Egypt,
and Sumer, first higher civilizations,…
Transition
2 The Axial Age, from China to Greece/Rome. Onset of two or more world religions in
India
and Israel, multiple sources of philosophy, birth of science, Greek democracy,…
Transition
3 Rise of modernity, onset of Reformation, secularism
, English, French, American Revolutions, Enlightenment, another scientific
revolution, another birth of democracy, Industrial Revolution,…
Suddenly, we have a clear holistic interpretation of world
history in the form of a non-random pattern behind us in the chronicle of known
history. It is non-random in the way it demonstrates an intermittent clustering
of creative action over long periods beyond the scope of individual will. It is
a pattern that explicitly defies the logic of chance, as it generates a sense of
coherence. We can even see ‘system return’ processes, like feedback,
attempting to restore direction or elements that have died out.
That’s it. With nothing more than a short outline of
world history we have stumbled into the detection of a non-random pattern, one
that is the essence of simplicity, and yet at the same time showing evidence of
a very deep and profound kind of complex system operating as a unity over
thousands of years. We need a generalized kind of systems analysis to deal with
this and can proceed to create a new kind of model that will help us to see what
is going on. But the point is clear that as our data for world history crosses a
five thousand year mark the larger dynamic behind it suddenly stands out. The
main task is to follow this pattern with an outline of world history.
The rest of this chapter will deal some ideas for an
‘eonic model’, and the connection between history and evolution. In addition
we will try to bring together an evolutionary framework and a Kantian theme of
the philosophy of history. But it is possible to simply proceed to our outline
of world history in Chapter Four, leaving the rest of this chapter as reference.
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